

Interoperability Implementation Strategy in Command and Control Systems for Security Crisis Management in the Indonesia–Malaysia Border Region

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KEYWORDS

Interoperability; command and control systems; border security; North Kalimantan; Indonesia-Malaysia

ABSTRACT

This research aims to analyze the actual conditions of interoperability within the command and control system, identify the obstacles encountered, and formulate strengthening strategies to enhance the effectiveness of security crisis management at the RI–Malaysia border. This research employs a qualitative approach, collecting data through in-depth interviews with seven key informants from the *TNI*, Polri, Regional Government, and border communities, alongside a review of *Pamtas* Task Force operational reports. Data analysis follows the Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña model, encompassing data condensation, coding, and data display, reinforced by PESTEL and SWOT frameworks to identify external and internal factors affecting the command and control system. The results show that the command system operates hierarchically from *Kodam VI/Mulawarman* to the *Pamtas* Task Force, with coordination conducted through *Forkopimda* and bilateral cooperation through *Patkor Malindo*. However, its effectiveness is hampered by the absence of an integrated command center, limited communication technology in *blank spot* areas, overlapping authorities, and insufficient technical regulations on interoperability. Strengthening strategies derived from the Strengths–Opportunities (SO) approach include: the establishment of an AI-based Integrated Border Command Center (IBCC) 4.0, the adoption of modern technology for real-time data integration, the reinforcement of bilateral defense diplomacy, the empowerment of communities through community-based security, and the enhancement of human resource capacity. The research concludes that optimizing interoperability requires military structural integration, modern technology, inter-agency synergy, and solid bilateral cooperation through an adaptive, collaborative, and sustainable approach.

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INTRODUCTION

The border areas of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (*NKRI*) hold immense strategic value as the frontline in safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation (Bire, Radja, Silvester, & Alexander, 2024; Fadhiil & Afriansyah, 2022; Zubaidi, Wiyana, & Ramadhani, 2024). Borders are not only regarded as physical lines separating Indonesia from neighboring countries, but also as the nation's primary defense against all forms of external threats (Djuyandi et al., 2024; Sumadinata et al., 2022). One land border area of primary concern is the Indonesia–Malaysia border on the island of Kalimantan, which stretches over 2,000 kilometers (Kartini et al., 2026). This region faces a variety of complex security challenges, ranging from the smuggling of goods and persons, border violations, and other

illegal activities that are difficult to detect owing to its highly challenging geographic conditions (T. Husain, 2024; Prayuda et al., 2025).

North Kalimantan Province is one of three provinces on the island of Kalimantan that directly border Malaysia, specifically the states of Sabah and Sarawak (S. B. Husain et al., 2021; Jalli & Sualman, 2020; Rudiatin, 2016). The border stretches 1,038 km, making it one of the longest land border corridors in the Indonesia–Malaysia bilateral region (Raharjo & Idris, 2025). The physical characteristics of the border area are highly varied, ranging from islands in the Makassar Strait to inland highlands covered by inaccessible tropical rainforests.

Security threats along the Indonesia–Malaysia border in North Kalimantan are diverse (Sudiar, 2020). According to the *Pamtas* Task Force operational report covering October 2023 to August 2024, there were 26 seizures of illegal liquor totaling 2,633 bottles/cans, 892 packs/cartons of illegal cigarettes, two arrests of drug users, and 33 inspections involving 143 Indonesian Migrant Workers (*PMI*) crossing the border unlawfully. Furthermore, territorial violations in the form of displaced boundary markers and conflicting territorial claims pose a persistent threat to Indonesia's territorial sovereignty (Bustami et al., 2025; Darwis et al., 2026).

The Indonesian government affirms that border security constitutes a vital component of the national interest (Iswardhana, 2024). This is stipulated in Law No. 43 of 2008 concerning State Territory, which underscores the protection of the sovereignty of the *NKRI*, including its border areas. The Indonesian Defense White Paper 2008 also establishes border security management as a strategic agenda, achieved through synergy among the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*TNI*), the Indonesian National Police (*Polri*), local governments, and the community. In the context of national defense, an integrated command and control (*KODAL*) system plays a crucial role in maintaining sovereignty, not only for military operations but also for cross-sector coordination.

However, in practice, the implementation of border security continues to face various structural and functional obstacles that impede operational effectiveness (Minnaar, 2022). Command fragmentation, weak information flows, and asynchronous field operations compound these challenges. The absence of an integrated command center capable of monitoring and directing a coordinated security response represents a fundamental weakness in the existing border defense system (Sumadinata et al., 2022).

Interoperability within the *KODAL* system is a key element that must be urgently established and strengthened. Interoperability refers not only to the capacity of equipment and technology to connect with one another, but also encompasses dimensions of doctrine, procedures, human resources, and a mutually supportive organizational culture (Margariti et al., 2022). With an interoperable *KODAL* system, information exchange between agencies can be conducted rapidly and accurately, thereby enabling efficient operational decision-making (Adenuga et al., 2024; Igwe-Nmaju, 2024).

Based on the foregoing background, the central problem of this research concerns how interoperability within the command and control system is implemented in addressing security crises in the border region between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly in North Kalimantan. This is elaborated through three research questions: first, what is the current state of interoperability implementation in command and control systems for security crisis management in the Indonesia–Malaysia border region, particularly in North Kalimantan; second, what obstacles are encountered in implementing interoperability in command and

control systems in this border region; and third, what strategies can be adopted to strengthen interoperability in command and control systems in order to enhance the effectiveness of security crisis management in the Indonesia–Malaysia border region. This study aims to analyze the actual conditions of interoperability within the command and control system, identify the obstacles encountered, and formulate strengthening strategies to enhance the effectiveness of security crisis management at the RI–Malaysia border, particularly in North Kalimantan. The findings of this research are expected to contribute theoretically to the development of defense and security studies, particularly with respect to interoperability concepts in border areas, as well as to offer practical benefits for policymakers in formulating more effective border security strategies, for military and law enforcement institutions in strengthening cross-agency coordination, and for future researchers as a foundation for further inquiry into border security interoperability.

METHOD

This research employed a qualitative approach with a case study design. The research location is the Indonesia–Malaysia border area in North Kalimantan, with a primary focus on the *Kodam* VI/Mulawarman Regional Military Command Headquarters (*Makodam*) in Balikpapan. Data collection was conducted through in-depth interviews with seven key informants: the Commander of *Kodam* VI/Mulawarman (A1), the Commander of the XIII Tarakan Naval Base (A2), the Commander of *Kodim* 0926/Tarakan (A3), the Head of the North Kalimantan Provincial Regional Defense Agency (*BPPD*) (A4), the North Kalimantan Regional Police Chief (A5), the Commander of the RI–Malaysia *Pamtas* Task Force, Nunukan Sector (A6), and community leaders from the border area (A7). In addition to interviews, this study also draws on a review of official documents, *Pamtas* Task Force operational reports, and relevant academic literature.

Data analysis was conducted using the Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña model, which encompasses data condensation, coding (open, axial, and selective), data display, and conclusion drawing. To strengthen the analytical framework, this study employs the PESTEL (*Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal*) approach to identify external factors, as well as SWOT (*Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats*) analysis to identify internal and external factors influencing the effectiveness of the command and control system. Data validity is ensured through source triangulation, whereby information obtained from multiple and varied informant sources is systematically cross-verified.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Current State of Command and Control System Interoperability

Research findings indicate that the command and control system for securing the Indonesia–Malaysia border operates within a hierarchical and integrated organizational structure. The border security command structure falls under *Kodam* VI/Mulawarman, which has established a Joint Task Force (*Kogasgab*) in Balikpapan with 30 personnel, supported by the Operations Implementation Command (*Kolakops*) of *Korem* 0921/Maharajalela in Tanjung Selor with 20 personnel. *Kolakops* oversees the East Sector *Pamtas* Task Force (17 posts, 350 personnel), the West Sector (14 posts, 350 personnel), the Territorial Task Force (139

personnel), the Air Task Force (20 personnel), the Army Aviation Task Force (23 personnel), and the Intelligence Task Force (20 personnel).

This hierarchical structure enables a clear chain of command and control and facilitates the conduct of operations in the border region. The command structure functions hierarchically, from the Regional Military Command (*Kodam*) down to implementing units in the field, such as the *Pamtas* Task Force (*Satgas Pamtas*), led by the Task Force Commander (*Dansatgas*), with a structured reporting flow through the *Kotis* post, *Koramil/Kodim*, and *Korem* up to *TNI* Headquarters. Cross-agency coordination is conducted through the Regional Leadership Coordination Forum (*Forkopimda*), involving the *TNI*, *Polri*, and Regional Governments, as well as through periodic joint operations.

With regard to communications systems, border security units have employed various technological assets, including radio communications (Hybrid Operational *HT* Radio), satellite communications, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) among them the Autel Evomax 4 NT and DJI Mini 3 thermal drones closed-circuit television (CCTV PTZ), and Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Several posts have also been equipped with *Starlink* satellite receivers to improve connectivity in remote areas. Efforts to strengthen communications infrastructure are further being pursued through collaboration between the *TNI* and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (*ESDM*), with the installation of solar-powered communications devices to address network limitations in *blank spot* areas.

Inter-agency coordination has been implemented through coordination meetings, the establishment of joint posts, and the execution of integrated field operations. *Kodam* VI/Mulawarman collaborates with the Indonesian Navy (*TNI AL*), the Indonesian Air Force (*TNI AU*), the Indonesian National Police (*Polri*), the State Intelligence Agency (*BIN*), the Directorate General of Customs and Excise, the Directorate General of Immigration, and the Natural Resources Conservation Agency (*BKSDA*) through information exchange and joint operations. *Polri* has also formed a cross-sectoral team involving multiple agencies, with *Polri* serving as the coordinating body. Coordination is organized around a shared vision, mission, and objectives, and is operationally facilitated by integrated posts that support joint patrols, intelligence sharing, and the handling of transnational crime.

At the bilateral level, cooperation with Malaysia has been realized through routine mechanisms such as the biannual Malindo Coordinated Patrol (*Patkor Malindo*), the Unit Commander Meeting (UCM), and the Malaysia–Indonesia Socio-Economic Forum (*SOSEK MALINDO*). These activities constitute an important platform for building mutual trust and sustaining cross-border communication. A hotline mechanism for emergency communications between *Korem/Satgas* and Malaysian forces in the border region is also in place to prevent misunderstandings and the potential escalation of conflict.

However, this interoperability system has not yet reached its full operational effectiveness. Interviews reveal that the inter-agency control system remains largely sectoral and dependent on informal coordination arrangements. There is no permanent integrated command center to serve as a platform for operational integration and strategic data exchange. Difficult geographical access and limited technological infrastructure remain the primary obstacles to realizing a fully integrated communications system. Numerous areas remain *blank spots*, frequently disrupting field-level coordination. Furthermore, the delineation of

responsibilities among the *TNI*, *Polri*, and civilian agencies lacks clear technical regulations, resulting in overlapping authority in the field.

Barriers to Implementing Command and Control System Interoperability

The analysis reveals that obstacles to implementing interoperability within the command and control system can be categorized into three types: technical barriers, non-technical barriers, and environmental barriers.

Technical barriers encompass limitations in communications infrastructure and technology. Communications systems between border posts continue to rely on long-range radio, cellular networks, and satellite systems; however, many remote posts remain afflicted by persistent network disruptions. Numerous areas remain *blank spots*, resulting in frequent interruptions to communications between security posts. Several posts are in a deteriorating structural condition or have sustained significant damage among them the Bambang Post, Sei Kaca Post, Kandangan Post, Simanggaris Lama Post, and Lumbis Post, all of which are timber-constructed. The Simantipal Post, in particular, suffered severe damage as a result of flash flooding. Limited communications equipment, including *HT* radios in affected areas, insufficient CCTV coverage, and inadequate surveillance assets, further compound these difficulties. The absence of real-time integrated inter-agency information systems constitutes an additional and significant obstacle to effective interoperability.

Non-technical barriers encompass institutional, human resource, and budgetary dimensions. Overlapping authority among the *TNI*, *Polri*, and civilian agencies — including the National Border Management Agency (*BNPP*) and regional governments — has resulted in suboptimal operational coordination in the field. This institutional disharmony has contributed to slow decision-making, particularly in crisis situations demanding rapid and coordinated responses. The absence of technical regulations explicitly governing inter-agency interoperability mechanisms has meant that joint operations frequently depend on informal coordination and the individual initiative of unit commanders in the field. A shortage of adequately trained personnel, constrained operational budgets, and insufficient specialized training in the use of modern communications tools and information systems constitute further obstacles. Difficult logistical access to remote posts including Saliku, Labang, Simantipal, and Lumbis, which are reachable only by air or by river in four to eight hours has compounded these challenges considerably.

Environmental barriers, arising from extreme geographic conditions, present a distinct category of challenge. The North Kalimantan border region is characterized by dense tropical forest, steep mountain ranges, large river systems, and terrain that is largely inaccessible by conventional means. These conditions create significant difficulties in the execution of area security and surveillance operations. Expansive remote waterways within forested and riverine terrain provide favorable conditions for smuggling and other illegal activities. Extreme weather events, including floods and landslides, also frequently disrupt patrol operations and the functioning of technological infrastructure. The geographic isolation of the region, compounded by the dependence of border communities on informal cross-border trade with Malaysia, further complicates law enforcement efforts and the broader strengthening of border security.

Strategies That Can Be Implemented to Strengthen Interoperability in The Command and Control System

Based on the PESTEL analysis, the external factors most influential in determining the effectiveness of the command and control system encompass political, technological, and legal dimensions. From a political perspective, national defense policy as stipulated in Law No. 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense and Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning the *TNI* has positioned border regions as the nation's strategic frontier. However, cross-sectoral coordination among the *TNI*, *Polri*, and local governments continues to face bureaucratic and sectoral obstacles. The absence of a permanent integrated command center frequently results in fragmented and delayed strategic decision-making. Conversely, the relatively stable bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia has supported the establishment of coordination mechanisms such as *Patkor Malindo* and *SOSEK MALINDO*.

From an economic perspective, the dependence of border communities on cross-border economic activities with Malaysia generates conditions conducive to legal violations, including smuggling and illegal trade. Budgetary constraints further affect the operational capabilities of security units in the field. From a social perspective, the heterogeneous composition of border communities and their cross-border socio-cultural ties create openings for illegal cross-border activities. Awareness of national defense and *wawasan kebangsaan* (national identity and civic consciousness) among border communities remains relatively low, owing to limited access to education and national public information.

From a technological perspective, the deployment of communications assets such as tactical radios, satellite systems, UAVs, and CCTV has contributed to expanding surveillance coverage. Nevertheless, many areas remain outside the reach of communications signals. The integration of communications systems across agencies — the *TNI*, *Polri*, and *BNPP* — is not yet fully real-time, resulting in delays in the exchange of operationally critical information. From an environmental perspective, complex geographic conditions — characterized by hilly topography, dense tropical forest, and expansive river systems — present significant challenges to the conduct of security operations. From a legal perspective, although the regulatory framework for border management is addressed through various instruments, overlapping authority among agencies persists. The absence of technical regulations specifically governing the interoperability of command and control systems frequently render joint operations reliant on informal coordination arrangements.

Opportunities that can be leveraged include government policies that designate border region development as a national strategic priority, advances in satellite technology and the expansion of the *Starlink* network, established cooperation forums such as *Patkor Malindo* and *SOSEK MALINDO*, security-integrated local economic development initiatives, and cooperative programs between ASEAN and relevant international institutions. Meanwhile, threats requiring sustained vigilance include smuggling, human trafficking, and narcotics trafficking; limited access and difficult terrain impeding force mobilization; potential territorial disputes and cross-border exploitation of natural resources; the use of advanced technology by criminal networks that may erode cyber defense capabilities; and illegal logging and mining activities that heighten the risk of environmental disasters.




Figure 1. SWOT Matrix

Source: Processed by the author based on research findings (2025)

Based on the SWOT matrix, this study recommends the application of an SO (*Strengths–Opportunities*) strategy, which leverages an organization's internal strengths to optimize available external opportunities. The strategies that can be developed are as follows:

1. Strengthening the Integrated Command Structure. The existing multi-layered *TNI–Polri* command structure extending from *Kodam VI/Mulawarman* down to the *Satgas Pamtas* can be optimized in alignment with government policy designating border regions as a national strategic priority. The establishment of an Integrated Border Command Center (IBCC) is essential as a unified command platform connecting elements of the *TNI*, *Polri*, and relevant civilian agencies including the National Border Management Agency (*BNPP*), the Directorate General of Customs and Excise, and the Directorate General of Immigration so that border surveillance is conducted in a coordinated and real-time manner.
2. Utilizing Modern Defense Technology and Information Systems. The operational capabilities of the *TNI–Polri* can be significantly enhanced through the integration of modern technological assets, including satellite systems, UAVs, radar, and the *Starlink* network. Modernization of the digital-based command and control system is essential to ensure that information from all border posts is consolidated into a unified network, enabling rapid and accurate operational decision-making. An integrated early warning and detection capability would further strengthen the ability to anticipate and preempt smuggling, infiltration, and other illegal cross-border activities.
3. Optimizing Defense Diplomacy and Bilateral Cooperation. The *Patkor Malindo* forum, UCM, and *SOSEK MALINDO* can be maximized to strengthen border security cooperation through structured intelligence exchange and joint exercises. Defense diplomacy can further serve as a mechanism to advance the formation of a Joint Border Task Force with a shared mandate to maintain border stability and uphold the sovereignty of both nations.
4. Empowering Border Communities as Security Partners. Border community participation can be strengthened through a participatory security model that involves them in early detection and regional surveillance. Communities become sources of

information and active partners, in line with government economic and social development programs in border areas.

5. Improving Human Resource Capacity and Personnel Professionalism. The *TNI-Polri* educational structure can be utilized to strengthen international cooperation and support multilateral institutions. Integrated inter-agency training in communications technology, intelligence analysis, and information systems will enhance the professionalism and technical capabilities of personnel and strengthen a collaborative work culture.

CONCLUSION

Research findings indicate that interoperability within the command and control system for security crisis management on the Indonesia–Malaysia border rests on a well-established organizational framework, yet continues to require optimization across technical, coordinative, and policy dimensions. Current implementation operates through a hierarchical command structure extending from *Kodam VI/Mulawarman* to *Kodim 0911/Nunukan*, cross-agency coordination through *Forkopimda*, and bilateral mechanisms such as *Patkor Malindo* and *SOSEK MALINDO*; however, its operational effectiveness remains constrained by the absence of an integrated command center, limited communications technology in *blank spot* areas, and insufficient technical regulations governing interoperability mechanisms. External factors — encompassing political, technological, and legal dimensions — alongside internal factors including command structure, inter-agency coordination, and community participation, underscore the need for policy harmonization and enhanced information technology to improve situational awareness and response speed. Through the *Strengths–Opportunities (SO)* strategy, key measures to strengthen interoperability include the establishment of an AI-based Integrated Border Command Center (IBCC) 4.0, the adoption of modern defense technology, the reinforcement of defense diplomacy, community empowerment as security partners, and the enhancement of human resource capacity through integrated training. The research's novelty lies in the introduction of the IBCC 4.0 concept grounded in artificial intelligence, sensor fusion, and a real-time interoperability dashboard together with the Border Crisis Interoperability Framework (BCIF), encompassing command integration, unified standard operating procedures, technology, diplomacy, and community participation, as well as the Dynamic Interoperability Protocols (DIP) as an adaptive, scenario-based crisis response mechanism. Future research is recommended to empirically test the BCIF and DIP frameworks through simulation or field trials in actual border operational environments, and to examine the applicability of the IBCC 4.0 model across other Indonesia–Malaysia border provinces — such as West Kalimantan and East Kalimantan in order to assess scalability, institutional readiness, and the broader generalizability of the proposed interoperability strategy within the national border defense architecture.

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