e-ISSN: 2723-6692 p-ISSN: 2723-6595
Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences, Vol. 5, No. 12, December 2024 3225
message and demonstrated Indonesia's resolve to protect its maritime resources. Indonesia also
engaged in "persuasive" diplomacy by inviting foreign journalists and officials to witness the vessel's
sinking operations (Parameswaran, 2020). This helped generate international attention and support
for Indonesia's anti-IUU fishing efforts.
Another key focus was leveraging diplomacy to attract investment and support for developing
Indonesia's maritime infrastructure and connectivity. This aligned with the Global Maritime
Fulcrum's emphasis on strengthening Indonesia's maritime economy. Indonesia actively promoted
its maritime infrastructure plans at international forums and to potential foreign investors. Major
initiatives included the Sea Toll Road program to enhance inter-island connectivity and the
development of deep-sea ports (Negara & Das, 2017).
To attract financing, Indonesia engaged with multilateral initiatives like China's Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) and Japan's Partnership for Quality Infrastructure. However, Indonesia was selective
in its engagement, seeking to balance between competing offers while maintaining strategic
autonomy (Weatherbee, 2019).
Indonesia also used maritime diplomacy to promote itself as a maritime tourism destination. It
launched the "Wonderful Indonesia" campaign internationally and pushed for visa-free policies to
boost marine tourism (Ministry of Tourism, 2019). A crucial element of Indonesia's maritime
diplomacy was asserting its status and rights as an archipelagic state. This involved both cooperative
and more assertive approaches.
Indonesia actively promoted the "archipelagic outlook" in various international forums,
emphasizing the interconnectedness of its waters and islands (Andika, 2018). It sought to generate
greater recognition of the specific needs and perspectives of archipelagic states. More assertively,
Indonesia took steps to reinforce its maritime sovereignty claims. This included renaming part of the
South China Sea within its exclusive economic zone as the "North Natuna Sea" in 2017
(Parameswaran, 2020). While not changing international law, this sent a signal about Indonesia's
maritime territorial claims.
Indonesia also increased its maritime presence and patrols in disputed areas, particularly
around the Natuna Islands. This demonstrated Indonesia's determination to protect its maritime
interests, even in the face of challenges from more considerable powers like China (Connelly, 2015).
In the latter part of Widodo's tenure, Indonesia's maritime diplomacy increasingly focused on
promoting its concept of the Indo-Pacific region. This represented a more proactive effort to shape
the regional architecture.
In 2019, Indonesia launched its "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific," which emphasized ASEAN
centrality and an inclusive, cooperation-based regional order (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019).
Through extensive diplomatic outreach, Indonesia successfully garnered ASEAN-wide support for
this outlook.
Indonesia also sought to position itself as a key Indo-Pacific maritime power through initiatives
like the Indonesia-South Pacific Forum. This aimed to enhance Indonesia's engagement with South
Pacific island nations on maritime issues (Weatherbee, 2019). Indonesia's maritime diplomacy efforts
under Joko Widodo yielded mixed results.
Indonesia made notable progress in enhancing regional maritime cooperation, mainly through
its leadership of IORA and initiatives within ASEAN (Amri & Zahidi, 2023). The Jakarta Concord
adopted under Indonesia's IORA chairmanship represented a milestone in fostering Indian Ocean